Yesterday, I quoted John Ioannidis’s description of how the pandemic was changing the norms of science:
There was absolutely no conspiracy or preplanning behind this hypercharged evolution. Simply, in times of crisis, the powerful thrive and the weak become more disadvantaged. Amid pandemic confusion, the powerful and the conflicted became more powerful and more conflicted, while millions of disadvantaged people have died and billions suffered.
First, note that no one person or thing (or a few countable ones) was responsible for the transformation, but rather that it was a natural property of the system. Then note that the pandemic sped up (or “hypercharged”) the system’s transition to its (breaking) endpoint. The American clinical trial ecosystem is even closer to its breaking point than science overall, and for the same reasons: its postulates make it untenable, and the influx of ZIRP-conjured pandemic-stamped money hypercharged the transition to this.
People go looking for ways to speed up clinical trials like they would for speeding up house construction. They ask: what is one key piece of legislation — the parking and zoning requirements of clinical research — that could either be tweaked or removed to break open the damn, so that trials would be as fast as they were in the 1960s? And why won’t the clinical trial hobbits tell us what those obstacles are, so that we can crush them?
But there is no one, or two, or two dozen such obstacles, the serial removal of which could speed up trial design, approvals, execution and readouts. The clinical trial path does not have boulder problem. Boulders would in fact be great: at least you can, while climbing over or making a 3-day detour around, fantasize about crushing them.
No, the problem with the path is that it runs through quicksand while being covered by a dense fog. Move too fast or stand in place and you die; move too slowly and you don’t get anywhere. Not that you know where to go: with all-encompassing fog you can only see five inches ahead anyway. There is not much time to think about anything else when you are in that kind of a quagmire, and how exactly would you imagine dealing with the fog? Drive it away with a big fan?
By “quicksand” I mean the moral, ethical and physical safety risks inherent to any clinical trail This is why every introductory course on the topic must start with the ignominious history of experimenting on humans… and the systems we developed to deal …immediately followed by a description of Institutional Review Boards and other regulatory matters. with them.
By “fog” I mean that much of the deliberation is not a matter of legislation but of opinion, values, principles and — the most loaded of words — comfort of people sitting on these IRBs and in the regulatory agencies. Depending on comfort level of individual members a question on whether a trial can proceed may take much deliberation or none at all. We can hardly know our own minds, and good luck about reading other people’s.
This is why I am skeptical that uncovering the FDA’s records would be of help to anyone but historians: the people who wrote them and interpreted them are no longer in play; different brains run the show, and the archives won’t reveal their thought process. Sure, sometimes there is one person sitting there that makes things worse than they should be, by being too slow, or thoughtless, or obstinate. But is “find better people” a tenable solution, when those people could be doing anything else, and with more reward of all kinds?
The pandemic hypercharge made everything worse. In addition to wading through quicksand while blinded by fog you now have to deal with many, many invisible neighbors elbowing you in the chest and kicking you in the groin, some intentionally, some out of carelessness, confusion, or not knowing any better. IRBs are overloaded and so are the regulators. What difference would any legislative change make?
Except, of course, it is to abolish one or both. It would lift the fog, sure, but would need a new kind of system to avoid making everyone sink to the bottom of the ethico-moral pit. Tearing down institutions is easy, building them is hard, as we see one but not the other being played out under our inattentive eyes.